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Abstract Antisocial punishment—punishment of pro-social cooperators—has shown
to be detrimental for the efficiency of informal punishment mechanisms in public goods
games. The motives behind antisocial punishment acts are not yet well understood.
This article shows that inequality aversion predicts antisocial punishment in public
goods games with punishment. The model by Fehr and Schmidt (Q J Econ 114(3):
817–868, 1999) allows to derive conditions under which antisocial punishment occurs.
With data from three studies on public goods games with punishment I evaluate the
predictions. A majority of the observed antisocial punishment acts are not compatible
with inequality aversion. These results suggest that the desire to equalize payoffs is
not a major determinant of antisocial punishment.
Keywords Antisocial punishment · Inequality aversion · Public goods · Informal
punishment · Experimental economics
JEL Classification D03 · H41 · C72 · C91
1 Introduction
A large strand of literature in experimental social psychology and experimental eco-
nomics has demonstrated that informal sanctions can solve social dilemmas.1 The
upshot of this literature is that, when people are able to punish others dependent on
their contributions, they do so in a way that free riding is no longer profitable and even
1 See e.g. Yamagishi (1986); Ostrom et al. (1992) and Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002).
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selfish subjects find it worthwhile to contribute. The public goods game is then no
longer a social dilemma and the groups manage to avoid the tragedy of the commons
(Hardin 1968). This is very remarkable, because the punishment of free riders is per
construction also plagued by free rider incentives: in the best world I would have others
educate the free riders to become contributors and enjoy their contributions without
engaging in costly punishment myself.
Recent experimental evidence, however, puts the universality of these results into
question. Gächter et al. (2005) began investigating public goods games with punish-
ment in different cultures and found that the punishment option is hardly effective
in enhancing cooperation in some of their subject pools. They presented preliminary
evidence that the variation in cooperation across their subject pools is connected to
the use of the punishment option. Interestingly, the differences are not in the way sub-
jects treat free riders, but in the way they treat cooperative subjects. For punishment
targeted to subjects with an equal or a higher contribution than the punisher Herrmann
et al. (2008) coined the term ‘antisocial punishment’.2 They investigate 16 cultur-
ally diverse subject pools and show that there is a clear-cut connection between the
prevalence of antisocial punishment and the effectiveness of the punishment option in
fostering cooperation. In subject pools where antisocial punishment is frequent sub-
jects do not profit from the punishment option and earn lower profits than without the
punishment option.
Given that antisocial punishment is a major obstacle for cooperation it is impor-
tant to understand the motives behind antisocial punishment. Fehr and Gächter (2000,
p. 990) devote a footnote to the causes of antisocial punishment. They mention ran-
dom error, improvement of the relative position (status preferences), and revenge
for anticipated or past punishment. Herrmann et al. (2008) provide a more exten-
sive account for the causes of antisocial punishment, adding ‘do-gooder derogation’
(Monin 2007), and a desire to punish non-conformists to the list. In the data they
find evidence for the revenge explanation but their experiment is not designed to
differentiate between various motives behind antisocial punishment. To date there is
no experimental study that systematically explores the causes of antisocial punish-
ment.
This paper brings an additional, maybe surprising reason for antisocial punishment
into the discussion. In the next section I use the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
to show that inequality aversion predicts antisocial punishment in many cases. Con-
sider a situation where (i) cooperative players are faced with a free rider and (ii) not
all cooperators are willing to punish the free rider. Inequality aversion predicts that
those who punish do not only punish the free rider, but also the cooperative players
2 There are different definitions for the punishment of cooperative subjects in the literature. Herrmann et al.
(2008) focus on the bilateral comparison of contributions between punisher and punishee. Falk et al. (2005)
investigate motives behind the punishment decision in the prisoners’ dilemma and call the punishment of
cooperative subjects ‘spiteful punishment’, indicating that they see the motive to increase payoff differences
as a determinant for such punishment acts (see also Masclet et al. 2003). Cinyabuguma et al. (2006) define
‘perverse punishment’ as punishing a subject who contributes more than the group average. They investigate
whether second order punishment, i.e., punishing the punishers, eliminates perverse punishment. Nikiforakis
(2008) addresses a similar question in a different design. Further data on antisocial punishment are reported
by Anderson and Putterman (2006); Ertan et al. (2009), and Gächter and Herrmann (2009, 2011).
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who do not punish. This happens for purely material reason: it ensures that the
punishing players do not fall behind the players who free ride on their punishment
expenditures.
Suspecting inequality aversion as a motivation for punishment acts is quite natural.
For punishment of free riders Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) and Fowler et al. (2005)3
provide evidence that egalitarian motives drive punishment decisions. In Sect. 3, I use
data from three experimental studies on public goods games with punishment to inves-
tigate whether the same is true for antisocial punishment. The answer is no—a majority
of antisocial punishment acts occur in situations which do not meet the conditions for
antisocial punishment as explained by inequality aversion.
2 Theory
On pages 836–843 Fehr and Schmidt (1999) derive equilibria in public goods
games with and without punishment. They show that in both games cooperative
equilibria are possible, provided sufficiently many players are sufficiently inequal-
ity averse. In the public goods game without punishment selfish players always
contribute zero. In the game with punishment even selfish players contribute as
long as there is a subgroup of inequality averse players ready to punish devia-
tors. Fehr and Schmidt’s characterization of the off-equilibrium path in the game
with punishment is, however, incomplete and thus fails to account for antisocial
punishment. In the following I show that inequality averse players might not only
punish deviant group members, but also players who contributed more than them-
selves.
2.1 The game
There are n  3 players with an endowment of y monetary units. The game consists
of two stages. In the first stage players simultaneously contribute gi ∈ [0, y] to a
public good. After the contribution decision all players learn all contributions and
their stage 1 earnings wi , calculated as
wi (g) = y − gi + a
n∑
j=1
g j , (1)
where g is the vector of all contributions and a is the marginal per capita return
of the public good with 1
n
< a < 1. In the second stage players can punish each
other bilaterally by assigning punishment points pi j  0, which reduce the monetary
payoff of j by one unit at a cost of c units to the punisher i , and 0 < c < 1. Antisocial
punishment occurs when a player i punishes another player j who chose a weakly
higher contribution (g j  gi ). Punishment of a player j with a lower contribution
(g j < gi ) will be labeled as free-rider punishment, irrespective of the absolute level
of g j . The final monetary payoff for player i is
3 See also Dawes et al. (2007) and Johnson et al. (2009).
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xi (g, P) = wi (g) −
n∑
j=1
p ji − c
n∑
j=1
pi j , (2)
with P being an n × n matrix with imposed zeros on the main diagonal (masochistic
punishment is usually not allowed in these experiments). Players have Fehr–Schmidt
utility functions
ui (x) = xi − αi
n − 1
∑
j =i
max
[
x j − xi , 0
] − βi
n − 1
∑
j =i
max
[
xi − x j , 0
]
, (3)
where every unit of payoff difference in bilateral payoff comparisons reduces utility
by αi/(n − 1) in case the other player earns more and βi/(n − 1) in case the other
player earns less than player i . Fehr and Schmidt put restrictions on the preference
parameters: both kinds of inequality hurt or are neutral (αi , βi  0), having less than
others hurts weakly more than having more (αi  βi ), and having more than others
must not hurt so badly that an individual would want to burn his own money to restore
equality (βi < 1).
Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 841) show that, if sufficiently many players are inequal-
ity averse, subgame perfect equilibria with non-minimal contributions gi = g ∈
(0, y] ∀ i exist. In these equilibria also selfish players contribute g, because they face a
credible threat of punishment by the inequality averse players. In equilibrium no pun-
ishment occurs. To explain any kind of punishment, we need to assume that at least
one player deviates from the equilibrium strategy and chooses gi < g. In the following
we restrict our attention to the subgame where pi j is chosen; I refer to this subgame
as the ‘punishment subgame’.4 I present three simple numerical examples to illustrate
how players with Fehr–Schmidt preferences punish other players. A general solution
of the punishment subgame is provided in the Appendix. The first two examples focus
on a situation in which only one player is willing to punish other players.
2.2 The lone enforcer
Example 1 Consider the game with {n, y, a, c} = {3, 20, 12 , 13
}
. Assume the group
consists of two players, 1 and 2, with selfish preferences, i.e. {αi , βi } = {0, 0}, i =
1, 2, while the third player E shall be inequality averse with {αE , βE } = {4, .6},
henceforth called the enforcer.
Consider a situation where E and player 1 contributed 20, while player 2
contributed 0.5 The first part of Table 1 shows the utilities that result from this situation
if no punishment is exerted. How should players punish each other? The two selfish
4 In fact, the analysis that follows is applicable to any situation where members of a group of n players,
endowed with some income w, can mutually reduce their incomes by the punishment mechanism described
in Eq. (2).
5 Fehr and Schmidt (1999, p. 841) show that the composition of types and parameters assumed here allows
for a fully cooperative equilibrium. To explain punishment we need to assume that one player deviates in
the contribution stage.
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Table 1 Antisocial punishment in a three player public goods game with punishment
Player gi No punish. Fehr–Schmidt Prop. 5 Optimal
wi ui pE j xi ui pE j xi ui
E 20 20 −20 10 −10 0 0
1 20 20 20 20 20 20 0 0
2 0 40 40 30 10 10 40 0 0
Bold numbers indicate utilities or punishment acts of player E , the enforcer
players would certainly not punish because punishment is costly and yields no benefit
to them. Player E , however, might want to punish because she does not like the fact that
player 2 earns more than she does. Her utility without punishment amounts to −20,
because she suffers from disadvantageous inequality towards player 2 of 20 monetary
units. According to the Fehr–Schmidt utility function this difference is weighted by
αE/2 and subtracted from her monetary income. What relief can E give herself by
punishing others? According to Fehr and Schmidt’s Proposition 5, E should reduce
player 2’s income by pE2 = 30 units (see intermediate columns in Table 1). This
would equalize player 2’s and E’s monetary income and increase E’s utility to −10.
However, this is not the equilibrium of the punishment subgame. In fact, E is
not playing best response if she just punishes the deviator (player 2). The last three
columns of Table 1 show the optimal punishment strategy. E maximizes her utility if
she punishes both other players. She does so in a way to equalize all three monetary
payoffs, which allows her to enjoy a utility of zero. Thus, the Fehr–Schmidt utility
function does indeed predict antisocial punishment, i.e. punishment of players who
are equally or more cooperative than the punisher.
Table 1 shows also that the punishment for the free rider becomes harsher once we
take antisocial punishment into account. For the existence of an equilibrium with non-
minimal contributions punishment has to be sufficiently strong to make deviations
unprofitable. This is clearly the case in the example: had player 2 contributed 20
there would have been no punishment and all players would have earned 30. With the
deviation player 2 earns 10 (according to Fehr–Schmidt) or 0 for optimal punishment.
Thus, if the parameter constellation derived in Fehr–Schmidt Prop. 5 allows for a
cooperative equilibrium it will also do so when we take the possibility of antisocial
punishment into account.6
Example 2 In a next step let us consider a richer example. Table 2 depicts the situation
of a public goods game with {n, y, a, c} = {4, 20, 25 , 13
}
. To make things interesting
I assume that the enforcer chose a contribution of 9, and the other players in the
group chose 0, 11 and 20. This produces a set of stage 1 earnings as depicted in the
third column of Table 2. Let us look at two types of enforcers, a ‘weakly inequality
averse’ player with {αE , βE } = {1, .6}, and a ‘strongly inequality averse’ player with
6 The inclusion of antisocial punishment does not affect the general structure of the equilibria described
in Fehr–Schmidt’s Prop. 5, where all players contribute g ∈ (0, y] in the first stage and punishment occurs
only off equilibrium.
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Table 2 Optimal punishment for a weakly or strongly inequality averse enforcer in a four player public
goods game with punishment
Player gi No punish. Weakly ineq. averse Strongly ineq. averse
wi ui pE j xi ui pE j xi ui
EαE =1
EαE =4
}
9 27
{
21.4
12.4 25
{
21.5
16.5 20
{
19.2
19.2
1 0 36 36 6 30 30 16 20 20
2 11 25 25 25 25 5 20 20
3 20 16 16 16 16 16 16
{αE , βE } = {4, .6}. These two types will have different optimal punishment patterns.
The three columns in the middle of Table 2 show the optimal punishment strategy of the
weakly inequality averse player. Such a player maximizes his utility by punishing the
richest among the other players (the free rider). However, punishment is only utility
maximizing as long as E’s income does not drop below another player’s income.
Consequently, as soon as player E’s income is as low as the next lower income (in
this case player 2’s income), he does not exert more punishment, despite the fact that
player 1 still earns more than he does.
A strongly inequality averse player does not stop here. Her much higher αE means
that the income difference towards player 1 still weighs heavily on her well-being.
A strongly inequality averse player prefers to further decrease player 1’s income.
However, in order to avoid falling behind player 2, she punishes both other players
with weakly higher incomes. Player E’s utility is maximized when the incomes of
player 1 and 2 are equal to her own income.
What does this mean for antisocial punishment? The weakly inequality averse
player in our example does not engage in antisocial punishment, whereas the strongly
inequality averse player does mete out punishment to a player who was more coop-
erative than herself. This example demonstrates the necessary conditions for anti-
social punishment: (i) player E must be sufficiently inequality averse to be willing
to punish more than one other player, (ii) there must be at least one player with
a strictly higher income than E and (iii) in the process of punishing the strictly
richer player, E’s income must undershoot one of the other (weakly poorer) player’s
incomes.
2.3 Teaming up
Example 3 What if more than one player is inequality averse enough to punish other
players? Let there be a subgroup of n′ = 2 homogeneous enforcers7 and {n, y, a, c} ={
4, 20, 25 ,
1
3
}
. Table 3 shows the situation of two enforcers with {αE , βE } = {4, .6}
facing one cooperative player and one free rider. According to Proposition 5 in Fehr
and Schmidt the two enforcers should punish player 2 (the free rider) such that this
player’s income is equal to their income. However, similar to the case of the lone
7 To keep things simple I assume that all enforcers are homogeneous both in their preferences (equal αE
and βE ) and in their stage 1 earnings wEi .
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Table 3 Optimal punishment in a four player public goods game with punishment with two enforcers
Player gi No punish. Fehr–Schmidt Prop. 5 Optimal punishment
wi ui pE1 j pE2 j xi ui pE1 j pE2 j xi ui
E1 20 24 −16 20 12 19 19
E2 20 24 −16 20 12 19 19
1 20 24 24 24 24 2.5 2.5 19 19
2 0 44 44 12 12 20 20 12.5 12.5 19 19
enforcer, the two enforcers can improve their situation if they also punish player 1. In
the example they maximize their utility by equalizing the monetary payoff of all four
players. However, unlike in the case of the lone enforcer, only punishing the deviant
player is also an equilibrium of the punishment subgame. If E1 punishes only player 2
by 12 units, then E2’s best response is to punish only player 2 by 12 units as well
and vice versa. However, the equilibrium including antisocial punishment towards the
fully contributing non-enforcer is clearly more efficient for the two enforcers.
2.4 Conditions for antisocial punishment
The three examples show that antisocial punishment motivated by Fehr–Schmidt
inequality aversion happens only in order to prevent falling behind other players who
do not punish.8 The Appendix provides a general solution to the punishment subgame.
A decisive prerequisite is the existence of other players who do not engage in punish-
ment. Thus, the decision whether to engage in antisocial punishment or not depends
on players’ beliefs about other players’ punishment behavior. This dependency on
beliefs makes it difficult to identify sufficient conditions for antisocial punishment and
an empirical investigation would require information about subjects’ beliefs about all
other punishments. However, for an empirical test of the predictions it is easy to derive
two necessary conditions for the occurrence of antisocial punishment in public goods
games with punishment, which hold for any belief about other player’s α and β. If
antisocial punishment is motivated by Fehr–Schmidt like inequality aversion, then it
must hold that:
C1: A maximum earner never punishes, i.e. antisocial punishment can only occur if
the punisher’s stage 1 income is below the maximum stage 1 income in the group.
C2: The only reason for an enforcer to punish a weakly poorer player is to avoid
falling behind this player while punishing free riders. Consequently, antisocial
punishment can only occur in combination with punishment of a richer player.9
8 Note that the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) is also capable in predicting antisocial pun-
ishment, but does so in a rather trivial way. In this model players care about their share of the total pie (and
their own income). If they earn too low a share they can increase their share by punishing any other group
member, not just the free rider. Consequently, the ERC model has no predictive power whatsoever about
the direction of punishment.
9 This holds for symmetric equilibria of the punishment subgame, i.e. equilibria where all enforcers punish
the other players equally. Because the enforcers do only care about final payoffs they could freely reallocate
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Proofs are provided in the Appendix. In the next step I confront these two conditions
with data on antisocial punishment.
3 Empirics
In this Section I use the data of three studies on public goods games with punishment.
First I look at the study by Fehr and Gächter (2002) who report data from 120 subjects
playing six rounds of the public goods game with punishment with {n, y, a, c} ={
4, 20, 25 ,
1
3
}
.
10 They use a perfect stranger matching protocol, which ensures that,
during the six rounds, a subject will not meet another subject in the session more than
once. Thus, from a game-theoretic perspective we observe the subjects playing six
consecutive one-shot games.
Before addressing the necessary conditions for antisocial punishment I investigate
the frequency of the prototypical situations for observing antisocial punishment. Recall
that the situations typically require the presence of a free rider and non-punishing
contributors. The overall frequency of free-rider punishment (strictly positive amounts
of punishment targeted to subjects with a lower contribution) in the sample is 46.9 %,
i.e. in slightly more than half of the cases subjects do not punish others with a lower
contribution.11
In a next step I investigate whether observed acts of antisocial punishment are in
line with the predictions of the Fehr–Schmidt model. The first result addresses C1.
Result 1 : Maximum earners punish
Support According to C1 all antisocial punishment must come from subjects who
earn less than the maximum stage 1 income in a group. In Fehr and Gächter’s data
top earners punish weakly poorer subjects by 1.60 punishment points on average.12
Antisocial punishment meted out by top earners is obviously not zero, but is that
number small or large? Subjects who are not among the richest in their group mete
Footnote 9 continued
punishment points among themselves, as long as the total amount of punishment meted out by each punisher
and received by each punishee remains constant. In case the group of enforcers is sufficiently large there
can be asymmetric equilibria where some enforcers mete out exclusively antisocial punishment.
10 I use only the data from the sessions with the sequence punishment—no punishment.
11 This number holds for all situations. It might be more interesting to consider only situations similar
to those described in Table 1, where there is a clear free rider. Consider the cases where three subjects
contribute strictly more than the group average and one subject contributes strictly less than the group
average. In 40.3 % of these cases all three high contributors punish the free rider. Consequently, in 59.7 %
of the situations not all three high contributors engage in free-rider punishment, leaving scope for antisocial
punishment as explained by inequality aversion.
12 The number corresponds to the parameter pi j in equation 2, i.e. to the average reduction of the punishee’s
income. In the experiment subjects choose ‘deduction points’, which reduce the punishee’s income by
three units and cost the punisher one unit. Deduction points are limited to integers and up to ten points
per punishment act. Thus, in the experiment the optimal punishment solution presented in Table 1 is not
feasible, because player 2’s income cannot be reduced by more than 30 units.
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out .43 punishment points to weakly poorer subjects.13 Thus, not only do the richest
subjects in the experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002) punish other weakly poorer
players—they do so even stronger than subjects who are not among the richest in
the group. This difference is significant by a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum test
(z = −2.61, p = 0.008, two-sided exact p-value, test based on independent session
averages).
Instead of just focusing on whether a subject is richest or not it is also possible to
consider a more fine grained measure for a subject’s position in the income hierarchy
before punishment. If we assign rank one to the richest subject(s) and subsequent
ranks for poorer subjects (standard competition ranking) then antisocial punishment
is decreasing in ranks starting with 1.60 for the richest to .48 (.32) for the second (third)
richest. The poorest cannot punish antisocially by definition. Interestingly, free-rider
punishment is also decreasing in ranks. The second (third, fourth) richest mete out 4.48
(3.34, 2.25) units of free-rider punishment. Thus strongest punishment of free riders
does not stem from the highest contributors but from the intermediate contributors.
This fits very nicely to the concept of inequality aversion because it suggests that
intermediate contributors are willing to pay a larger part of the punishment costs than
the poorer high contributors in their group. Thus, while free-rider punishment seems
to be accessible to an inequality aversion explanation, antisocial punishment is not.
Result 2 : Subjects frequently mete out only antisocial punishment
Support According to C2 every act of antisocial punishment should be accompanied
by punishment of a subject with a lower contribution than the punisher. The upper part
of Table 4 classifies all 720 individual punishment vectors. In about 43 % of the cases
no subject gets punished. In about 42 % of the cases only free riders (i.e. subjects with
a lower contribution than the punisher) receive punishment. About 15 % (105) of the
cases involve antisocial punishment. In 75 % of these cases antisocial punishment is not
accompanied by free-rider punishment. Thus, contrary to the theoretical prediction,
antisocial punishment is most frequently meted out without accompanying free-rider
punishment.
The evidence presented clearly indicates that the two necessary conditions for
antisocial punishment as explained by the Fehr–Schmidt model are very frequently
not met for actual acts of antisocial punishment. The analysis could, however, be
influenced by the fact that subjects in the experiments by Fehr and Gächter (2002)
play six consecutive games. Despite the use of the perfect stranger matching we cannot
be sure that the game reflects a true one-shot game. The fact that the authors observe a
time trend in average contributions even suggests that the six rounds are not identical.
A recent study by Gächter and Herrmann (2009) provides data from true one-shot
games with {n, y, a, c} = {3, 20, 12 , 13
}
. In a next step I apply the same analysis to this
13 This comparison controls for the fact that a subject who is among the richest players has more ‘occasions’
to engage in antisocial punishment than a poorer subject, because it is the average number of punishment
points assigned in all bilateral comparisons with weakly poorer subjects. Looking at absolute numbers the
difference becomes even stronger. From a total of 1188 units of payoff reduction by antisocial punishment
921 (78 %) are caused by the richest subjects in the group.
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Table 4 No. of cases with no,
antisocial, free rider, or both
kinds of punishment, with row
and column totals
Data source upper part Fehr and
Gächter (2002), lower part:
Gächter and Herrmann (2009);
own calculation
Free-rider punishment
No Yes
Fehr and Gächter (2002)
Antisocial punishment
No 310 305 615
Yes 79 26 105
389 331 720
Gächter and Herrmann (2009)
Antisocial punishment
No 130 75 205
Yes 43 17 60
173 92 265
dataset. The data contain observations from 265 subjects in four locations in Russia
and Switzerland.14 For the moment I ignore the fact that motivations for antisocial
punishment might differ across subject pools. This point will be addressed below.
The results from the first and second dataset are qualitatively very similar. In the
data by Gächter and Herrmann (2009) average antisocial punishment meted out by
top earners is 2.24 compared to .95 by all other subjects. The difference is significant
(z = −3.04, p = 0.002, test based on individual observations). The lower part of
Table 4 also shows that in this dataset the majority of antisocial punishment acts (72 %)
is not accompanied by free-rider punishment.
Cheung (2012) provides further evidence on one-shot games using the same para-
meters as Gächter and Herrmann, but with the punishment decision elicited by the
strategy method. Subjects choose punishments for all possible combinations of other
subjects’ contributions. This allows for a much more detailed analysis of punishment
behavior.15 The paper does not provide exact numbers on C1 but from the figures it
becomes clear that there is a considerable amount of punishment meted out by the
maximum earners. For C2 Cheung (2012, p. 24) provides a detailed analysis showing
that 21 out of 280 cases potentially fit to inequality aversion. However, the majority of
the subjects involved does also punish antisocially when being among the maximum
earners, which is clearly incompatible with the prediction.
Herrmann et al. (2008) report data from 16 subject pools from various cultural
backgrounds. They observe punishment decisions from experiments with ten times
repeated public goods game with punishment and {n, y, a, c} = {4, 20, 25 , 13
}
. Their
data contain observations from 1,120 subjects in 16 cities around the globe. The 16
subject pools differ markedly in the frequency and strength of antisocial punishment.
Thus, even if inequality aversion fails to explain antisocial punishment in the three
14 Like in the first dataset I use only the data from the sessions which started with the one-shot public goods
game with punishment.
15 The data does, however, still not allow to identify sufficient conditions for antisocial punishment. To do
so would require control over the subjects’ beliefs about all other punishment decisions.
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Table 5 Patterns of antisocial
punishment across subject pools
Data source Herrmann et al.
(2008), own calculation
Antisocial punish-
ment when…
Perc. only anti-social
punishment
Richest Not richest
Athens 4.03 0.86 86.4 %
Bonn 0.34 0.48 68.3 %
Boston 0.26 0.15 93.3 %
Chengdu 0.50 0.34 89.4 %
Copenhagen 0.33 0.28 84.2 %
Dnipropetrovs’k 1.37 0.65 80.9 %
Istanbul 1.32 0.72 72.4 %
Melbourne 0.73 0.32 80.0 %
Minsk 1.44 1.39 64.5 %
Muscat 3.81 3.23 67.6 %
Nottingham 0.37 0.13 83.3 %
Riyadh 1.86 2.23 57.7 %
Samara 2.34 1.02 73.7 %
Seoul 0.60 0.40 79.0 %
St.Gallen 0.49 0.34 81.3 %
Zurich 0.48 0.20 85.1 %
Total 1.03 0.79 75.5 %
datasets discussed so far it is possible that this explanation works well in some of the
subject pools observed by Herrmann et al. (2008).16
Table 5 shows the two measures discussed above for each of the 16 subject pools
separately. The first column shows the average punishment meted out by subjects
who are maximum earners in the specific period. This is the number that should be
zero according to the prediction. Obviously there is a huge variation in the strength
of antisocial punishment. Average punishment differs by more than a factor ten when
comparing the extreme cases. The second column shows the average antisocial pun-
ishment by subjects who are not among the richest in their group. In 14 out of the 16
subject pools subjects choose more antisocial punishment when they are top earners
compared to when there are others in the group with higher stage 1 incomes.
The third column in Table 5 shows the fraction of antisocial punishment acts not
accompanied by free-rider punishment. Everywhere, in at least 50 % of the cases with
antisocial punishment subjects mete out only antisocial punishment. To conclude,
16 The analysis presented here uses data from a dynamic game to test a static prediction. This could be
problematic because of strategic incentives in early rounds of the game. To check whether the results are
robust with regard to this concern I ran the analysis for the last period only. The last punishment subgame
played presents a true one-shot game. The results remain qualitatively unchanged.
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despite the huge differences in the level of antisocial punishment across subject pools
the pattern of antisocial punishment acts does not differ substantially. In none of the
subject pools antisocial punishment seems to be motivated by inequality aversion.
4 Conclusion
To test whether observed acts of antisocial punishment can be explained by inequality
aversion as formalized by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) I derived two conditions: (i) the
punishing subject must not be among the richest in the group and (ii) antisocial pun-
ishment requires accompanying acts of free-rider punishment. Empirical evidence on
antisocial punishment shows that a majority of the punishment acts occur in situations
in which these two criteria are not met. Thus, inequality aversion is not a key deter-
minant of antisocial punishment. This paper contributes to the literature on motives
behind the punishment acts. Fowler et al. (2005) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) argue
that egalitarian motives drive punishment decisions. This might be the case for free-
rider punishment but most likely not for antisocial punishment. The results presented
here are in line with Falk et al. (2005), who compare the frequently used one-to-three
punishment technology to a one-to-one punishment technology (c = 1). In the latter
regime no Fehr–Schmidt player would use punishment. However, in their experiments
with Prisoners’ Dilemma games cooperators punished defectors also in the treatments
with c = 1, despite the fact that payoff differences could not be reduced.17 Defec-
tors’ punishment of cooperators was observed if c = 13 but vanished in the treatments
with the one-to-one punishment, indicating that relative payoff concerns may be an
important determinant of antisocial punishment.18 However, the relative payoff max-
imization hypothesis has a serious flaw when applied to public goods experiments
with four players and one-to-three punishment mechanism (like used e.g. in Fehr
and Gächter 2002 or Herrmann et al. 2008): Given these parameters no player can
improve her relative position towards the others by punishment. Due to c = 13 every
unit invested in the punishment of another player j increases the relative position
towards j by two units ( j loses three, punisher loses one). However, at the same time
the relative position towards the other two players decreases by one unit. Thus, if a
relative payoff maximizer weighs all bilateral comparison equally, then punishment
does not improve the relative position at all.19
Understanding the determinants of antisocial punishment is crucial, given that the
efficiency of sanctioning mechanisms strongly depends on the frequency and strength
of antisocial punishment, leading to strikingly different macro results across different
cultures (Gächter et al. 2010). The contribution of this paper is to show that interde-
pendent preferences as formalized in the Fehr–Schmidt model provides a rationale for
17 See also Masclet and Villeval (2008) and Egas and Riedl (2008) for data on one-to-one punishment.
18 See also Houser and Xiao (2010).
19 Such a relative payoff maximizer could be characterized by having a utility function as shown in Eq. (3)
with β < 0. For example, a player with β = −α would always want to punish other players (irrespective
of whether they are poorer or richer) if cn < 1 + c and α > c(n−1)1+c−cn . For the parameters used in Fehr and
Gächter (2002) and Herrmann et al. (2008) the first condition holds with equality and requirements for α
go to infinity.
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antisocial punishment. Interestingly, antisocial punishment as rationalized by Fehr–
Schmidt preferences is kind of a higher order punishment, targeted to players who
are unwilling to bear their share of the punishment costs necessary to discipline the
free riders (see e.g. Denant-Boemont et al. 2007). Seen from this angle, antisocial
punishment might not be that ‘perverse’ after all.
The data, however, suggest that other forces must be at work. A likely candidate
is revenge. Subjects might engage in antisocial punishment to take revenge for pun-
ishment received in past periods or for anticipated punishment in the current period.
Herrmann et al. (2008) provide evidence for this, showing that antisocial punishment
is stronger when a subject was punished in the previous period. A second likely can-
didate is that some subjects might simply enjoy to destroy others’ property. There is
experimental evidence that, in some settings, subjects reduce other subjects’ incomes,
even if this comes at a cost to themselves (see e.g. Abbink and Herrmann 2011; Abbink
and Sadrieh 2009; Zizzo 2003; Zizzo and Oswald 2001). For public goods games with
punishment under uncertainty Grechenig et al. (2010) show that, contrary to the expec-
tation, being in doubt about other subjects’ actions does not discourage from using
the punishment option. Thus, a pure ‘appetite for destruction’ might account for some
of the antisocial punishment acts. This would be compatible with the observation that
antisocial punishment is, to a large extent, meted out by subjects with a high payoff.
These are the subjects who can afford to spend money on their pleasure to reduce the
income of others without falling behind others. An experimental analysis that cleanly
separates these causes is yet to be conducted.
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Appendix
Prerequisites
There are two types of players: a homogenous subgroup of n′ < n enforcers E1,
E2, …, En′ with α, β > 0 and n − n′ other players with α, β = 0. All enforcers have
identical provisional income, i.e. wE1 = wE2 = . . . = wEn′ . In case of n′ > 1 there is
usually an infinite number of equilibria in which all enforcers spend an equal amount
on punishment. In the following I will derive the symmetric equilibria most efficient
for the enforcers. The homogeneity assumption facilitates the derivation of equilibria
because all enforcers either punish or do not punish. In equilibrium all enforcers punish
equally and no inequality among them arises.
What are the conditions under which Fehr–Schmidt players might engage in anti-
social punishment? Enforcers face a distribution of provisional payoffs w and seek to
maximize their utility by choosing a punishment vector pEk for all k = 1, . . . , n′. In
the group there are n −n′ other players. These players shall be ordered according their
initial income wi , such that the incomes of the players are w1  w2  . . .  wr 
wEk > wr+1  . . .  wn−n′ , i.e. Player 1 is the richest player, r players are weakly
richer than the enforcers, and n −n′ −r players are strictly poorer. The variable r is an
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indicator for the enforcers’ position in the income hierarchy. For r = 0 the enforcers
are the strictly richest players and there are n −n′ poorer players. In case of r = n −n′
the enforcers are (among) the poorest players.
Proof of C1 Will the enforcers ever punish players with a lower income? Due to
c < 1 this increases inequality towards the punished player. Furthermore, it reduces
the enforcers’ incomes by c and increases the inequality towards all players who are or
become richer than the enforcers. The only benefit the enforcers can get from punishing
a poorer player is that the reduction of their income reduces inequality towards the
other players with lower incomes by c. The case most favorable for punishing a poorer
player is thus the situation where a single enforcer is the richest player, i.e. r = 0.
In such a situation it would be utility enhancing to punish another player if benefits
outweigh costs, i.e.
β
n − 1 (n − 2)c > c +
β
n − 1 (1 − c). (4)
Rearranging leads to β − β
c(n−1) > 1. This inequality can only be satisfied for
β > 1, which is ruled out by the parameter restrictions of the Fehr–Schmidt model.
Thus, irrespective of the position in the income distribution the enforcers will never
punish a player with lower income than themselves. Note that this does not exclude
that punishment of players with wi < wE eventually takes place, when the enforcers
become poorer than other players due to their punishment of free riders. However, if
the enforcers are among the richest players in the first place, then this situation cannot
occur and, consequently, antisocial punishment can be ruled out. unionsq
Proof of C2 What is the structure of the optimal punishment strategy? The examples
in the main text already demonstrated that it can be utility enhancing for the enforcers
to punish free riders. The crucial question is not whether, but how many richer players
the enforcers are ready to punish.20 Punishing r weakly richer player has costs and
benefits: (i) punishment has direct costs of rc, (ii) due to c < 1 this decreases the dis-
advantageous inequality towards the punished player and (iii) it reduces the enforcers’
payoff advantage towards the other n − r − n′ players with lower income by c. Taken
together, punishing all r weakly richer players pays if 21
rc
︸︷︷︸
i
<
α
n − 1r(n
′ − rc)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
ii
+ β
n − 1 (n − r − n
′)rc
︸ ︷︷ ︸
iii
. (5)
This expression allows to identify the effect of changes in the preference parameters:
punishing richer players is more likely to be profitable if the enforcers’ inequality
20 Due to the linearity in payoff differences in the Fehr–Schmidt utility function E is indifferent between
shifting punishment points from one richer player to another richer player. Thus, if a player E is ready to
punish one richer player by, say , then she is also ready to punish two richer players by 2 .
21 Here I assume that all enforcers use the same punishment strategy so that no inequality towards other
enforcers arises. In case of n′ > 1 Eq. 5 describes a joint optimization for all enforcers.
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aversion becomes stronger (α and β). Equalizing benefits and cost in Eq. (5) and
solving for r gives the maximum integer number of other players that will be punished
r˜ =
⌊
αn′
c (α + β) +
βn − βn′ − n + 1
(α + β)
⌋
. (6)
It is easy to show that r˜ increases in the number of enforcers n′. The expression is
decreasing in n, which is due to the fact that in larger groups the inequality towards
the r richer players has less weight in an enforcer’s utility function. Furthermore, r˜ is
decreasing in c, i.e. more expensive punishment reduces the number of other players
the enforcers are willing to punish.
What is the optimal amount of punishment? As demonstrated in Table 2 we have to
check whether punishment is constrained by the income of the next poorer player or
not. For unconstrained punishment all enforcers and weakly richer players have the
same final payoff, i.e. we have to solve the following system of equations:
wEk − c
r∑
j=1
pEk j = wi −
n′∑
k=1
pEki ∀ i = 1, . . . , r and k = 1, . . . , n′, (7)
where the final income of an enforcer k is on the left hand side and the right hand
side shows the income of a weakly richer player i . To simplify matters I assume that
punishment of a player i is split equally among the enforcers. This allows to replace
pEk j by pE j and the sum on the right hand side by n′ pEi . Thus, dependent on r ,
optimal punishment points are
pEi = wi
n′
+ c
∑r
j=1 w j − n′wE
n′(n′ − rc) . (8)
Total expenditures of an enforcer for punishment in the unconstrained case are,
therefore,
πrE = c
r∑
i=1
pEi = c
∑r
i=1 wi − rcwE
n′ − rc . (9)
Clearly the amount of punishment necessary to bring down the r weakly richer
players decreases in n′. When is punishment unconstrained? If wE −πrE  wr+1 then
there is enough ‘room’ to punish all richer players without undershooting the income
of the next poorer player.
Otherwise the enforcers are in the constrained case. Here the enforcers’ incomes
will touch wr+1 before they could equate all incomes of the r richer players with their
own incomes. If this happens the number of weakly richer players increases by one
and the optimal punishment for r + 1 comes into action. The enforcers will include
further players into the group of punishees until either (i) there is no strictly richer
player anymore or (ii) the group of weakly richer players exceeds r˜ . To conclude, pun-
ishment expenditures depend on the distribution of the preliminary incomes w which
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is characterized by r , the number of weakly richer players. Punishment expenditures
are
πE (w) =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if r = 0 or r > r˜
πrE else if π
r
E  wE − wr+1
πr+1E else if π
r+1
E  wE − wr+2
...
π r˜E else if π
r˜
E  wE − wr˜+1 or r = r˜
wE − wr˜+1 else
(10)
In all but the first and last case the enforcers reduce the incomes of richer players
such that all r players earn the same income as the enforcers. In doing so the group
of weakly richer players might increase up to a maximum of r˜ . Depending on the
provisional income of player r˜ + 1 the enforcers equalize the incomes of all r˜ players
or mete out punishment such that their income is equal to wr˜+1. In the latter case the
free riders will keep some of their monetary payoff advantage relative to the enforcers
(as demonstrated by the case of the weakly inequality averse player in Table 2).
To conclude, if none of the players are richer than the enforcers then no one will be
punished. If some of the players are richer and others are poorer than the enforcers,
then the poorer players are punished if and only if the enforcers become poorer than
some of these players due to the punishment of free riders. Consequently, antisocial
punishment can only occur in combination with free-rider punishment. unionsq
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